INTRODUCTION
Islamic banking has been developing since the mid-1970s in peaceful competition with conventional banking. It has made significant progress in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where Arab Barometer surveys indicate widespread disapproval of interest-based lending and conventional banks in general. This chapter examines this data in order to better understand the characteristics of Islamic finance's potential clientele.
This study is undertaken with the hope that this financial movement may mobilize and educate people so as gradually to eliminate the informal economies that exploit them. It may encourage responsible entrepreneurship by bringing informal actors into a renovated formal banking system. Others have noted in cross-national studies comparing Muslim and non-Muslim financial behavior that religion is a significant impediment to inclusion in conventional banking systems (Demirguc-Kunt et al, 2013) . In societies distrustful of or rejecting conventional interest-based banking, Islamic finance can perhaps lure the informal economic actors out into the open by financing small and medium enterprises and even engaging in microfinance, which is much neglected in the region (El-Komi and Gerson, 2013) . 1 Evidently, shariah-compliant financial assets are steadily increasing as a percentage of commercial banking assets across most of the countries in the Muslim world where data is available. Driven by demand from wealthy Gulf investors, Islamic finance has steadily gained market share in many Arab countries, including Syria. Led by Malaysia, it is also gaining traction in Indonesia and other non-Arab countries having Muslim majorities. Even states with Muslim minorities, such as the United Kingdom, have Islamic banks catering to them. The grand total in the world of shariah-compliant financial assets, approaching $2 trillion, still, however, does not add up to those of a major American or Chinese bank.
2 Although Islamic banking continues to grow more rapidly than conventional banks in most Arab countries, the skeptic may ask whether it really mobilizes new clienteles or simply diversifies the portfolios, as in the Gulf, of wealthy investors. This chapter examines the evidence, focusing on selected underbanked countries where Islamic banking may be attracting new participants. However, before analyzing the market-share data, it is useful to examine Arab survey data to discover the social and political characteristics of the people who might be most attracted to Islamic finance.
POTENTIAL CLIENTS
Arab Barometer surveys conducted in 2007-08, 2011 and 2013 indicate that large majorities of representative national samples across the Arab world believe that conventional bank interests are contrary to the teachings of Islam. 3 Table 3 .1 summarizes the information, including only those who agreed or disagreed with the proposition that banks charging interest contradict the teachings of Islam. In the second wave of surveys, conducted in 2011, respondents were also asked whether, 'in order to meet the demands of the modern economy, banks should be allowed to charge interest'. While the responses were significantly correlated with the question about the teachings of Islam, the relationship was weak (r = -.162, p < .000): a fair number of respondents who had agreed that interest was forbidden in Islam also thought that banks should be allowed to charge interest regardless of the religious teachings. 4 The final two columns of Table 3 .1 therefore report the percentages of those really interest-averse people who both agreed that interest was haram (forbidden) and that banks should not charge interest.
This chapter assumes that these consistently interest-averse respondents would also be the most likely potential participants in Islamic forms of financial intermediation. They constitute sizable blocks of public opinion in what are supposed to be reasonably representative samples across the Arab world. Accordingly, the present analysis focuses on the findings of this second wave of public opinion surveys, since the other waves unfortunately had no independent check on the behavioral implications of the very widespread belief that bank interest is a religiously unacceptable practice. Here, the second wave locates the potential clients as well as practitioners of Islamic finance from surveys The correlates of unconditionally rejecting conventional interest-based banking ('haram interest-based banks') are reported in Table 3.2. Among Palestinians, as in the other population samples, rejecting conventional interest-based banking tended to come from cities rather than villages (including refugee camps in Palestine). Age did not make a significant difference, but males seemed slightly but significantly (p < 0.01) more likely to reject the conventional interest-based banks than females, as did those having higher levels of education and income. In Tunisia, however, education was negatively correlated, perhaps reflecting Bourguiba's legacy of modernization. Not surprisingly, the Christians, for the most part in Lebanon and Egypt, were also less likely to reject conventional banking, as were people who had traveled abroad in the past five years. Those who harbored conservative values about women's social roles also tended to reject interest-based banking, 5 as did those whose responses to a series of questions about their religious practices ranked them high on a religiosity scale. 6 Interest in politics 7 hardly made any difference but what is taken from the survey to indicate political Islamism did make a difference: Islamism, which correlated positively with religiosity (r = 0.215, p < 0.001) and with conservative values about women (r = 0.339, p < 0.001), was also significantly associated with opposition to interest-based banking. 'Islamism' was derived from correlated responses to six items designed to tap an 'Islamist-secular' dimension. 8 However, interest in politics was negatively rather than positively correlated with Islamism (r = -0.033, p < 0.001) whereas it was significantly associated with religiosity (r = 0.135, p < 0.001) and even more so in Tunisia (r = 0.212, p < 0.001), albeit not with 'Women at home'. Interest in politics, was weakly associated with the more secular perspectives connoted by the items detailed in endnote 5. These 'secular' attitudes, however, were by no means incompatible with religious commitment; they possibly reinforce one another.
To disentangle the possible effects of these correlates, some multivariate analysis is attempted here. A logistic regression is performed in which 'haram interest-based banks', the probability of rejecting conventional banking, is regressed on the entire set of correlates except religious affiliation (so not to exclude the Saudi and Yemeni data). By including education and religiosity, however, it was necessary to exclude Tunisia, where these variables were coded differently. The Tunisian data are therefore analyzed separately (see the following section). The respondents' country of residence (except Tunisia, and the baseline case of Jordan) is added to the regression as a dummy variable, and the results are reported in Table 3 .3.
This summary view presents in the final column the odds of categorically rejecting interest-based banking. The first row, for example, indicates that the odds of a respondent living in an urban environment (compared with a village or, in the case of the Palestinians, refugee camps as well), are 1.225 to 1, holding all the other variables constant. That is, living in a city increases the odds by 22.5 percent. Conversely, a villager is more likely not to reject interest-based banking. The finding is statistically significant: r < 0.001. Age also seems to make a difference. Although one added year of age increases the odds of rejecting interest-based banking by only 0.6 of a percentage point, ten years would increase them to 6 percent, statistically significant at the .01 level (p = 0.007). Gender, however, is no longer even statistically significant (as in Table 3 .2) when all the other variables are taken into account. Education and monthly income retain their statistical significance and deserve further discussion below.
Time spent over the past five years in the West is also associated, albeit negatively, with rejection of interest-based banking. One more point of time spent in the West on a fourpoint scale decreases the odds by 16 percent that the traveler will reject this Western form of financing. Religiosity and conservative attitudes about women's place in the world, on the other hand, are both strongly associated with the rejection of interest-based banking.
When all the other variables are taken into account, however, political Islamism loses the positive correlation with rejecting interest-based banking that was reported in Table 3 .2. The correlation reported in Table 3 .2 is reversed because religiosity and conservative values connoted by 'Women at home' have the critical independent effects. Pious conservative Muslims who also believe in a separation of religion from politics will be even more opposed to interest-based banking than pious conservatives who also conflate religion and politics. This may raise the prospects for Islamic finance in countries such as Egypt where political Islam has suffered losses but where the public remains conservative and highly religious. Whatever the fortunes of political Islamism, sympathy for Islamic finance may endure, as it seems protected by these traditional values. Do they vary depending on other country level variables, including the local culture and politics?
The most striking finding in Table 3 .3 is that, after taking account of the other variables, there are still enormous differences in banking preferences among residents of the different countries. With the exception of Sudan, all of the dummy variables are statistically significant. That is, the country of residence, presumably its culture and institutions, apparently help to shape these preferences. Compared with the baseline case of Jordan (selected because it is closest to the general average reported in Table 3 .1), even those living in the neighboring territories of occupied Palestine display remarkable differences. The odds become almost two to one that Palestinians living under occupation will reject conventional interest-based banking (after taking into account all the other variables). Table 3 .3 also shows that living in Algeria makes someone 34 percent more likely to oppose this Western practice than in the baseline case of Jordan. Also, as in Palestine, the odds soar to almost two to one in Saudi Arabia, where virtually all retail banking is shariah-compliant. In Egypt and Lebanon, on the other hand, with their Christian minorities, the odds decline to about one to two.
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF INCOME AND EDUCATION
Interactions between country of residence, on the one hand, and education and income, on the other, may offer a better understanding of the national variations in attitudes toward interest-based banking. It has already been noted in Table 3 .1 that the correlation between these attitudes and the respondent's educational level changed sign in Tunisia, where more education was associated with less distrust of interest-based banking. Table 3 .4 applies the logistic model developed in Table 3 .3 to Tunisia. There are other differences between Tunisia and the other Arab countries. In Tunisia, urban residence is associated with less, not more opposition to interest-based banking (although the result is not statistically significant), and time spent in the West makes no difference, perhaps given the exposure to Western values inside the country, a legacy of Habib Bourguiba built on the country's Mediterranean identity. In Tunisia, the only variable that is statistically significant is religiosity, but changes in sign of both household income and education suggest the need to examine the interactions of these variables with the other national environments as well. Table 3 .5 shows the additions to Table 3.3 that specify country interactions with education and income.
Education for the baseline case of Jordan remains positively correlated with opposition to interest-based banking, whereas monthly income loses any statistical significance there. Turning to other national environments, however, education reduces the potential commitment to Islamic finance except in Sudan and Yemen: in Iraq a one level increase in education reduces the odds of rejecting conventional interest-based banking by about 20 percent. In Lebanon too, education reduces the commitment significantly. By contrast, education in Sudan and Yemen is associated with slight, albeit statistically not very significant (p < 0.1 in Sudan) increases in opposition to conventional banking practices.
As for household income, where there are wide average per capita differences across Arab countries; two of the wealthier ones show statistically significant associations between family income and potential commitment to Islamic finance. They work, however, in opposite directions. In Saudi Arabia, a $100 increase in monthly income increases the odds by about 3 percent, and the effects appear to be statistically significant (p = 0.005), suggesting that portfolio diversification might be driving Islamic finance. 9 In Lebanon, by contrast, the odds decrease by small but statistically significant amounts. Possibly wealth has different effects in Lebanon because much of it is held in Christian hands. In the sample, the average monthly income of the 478 Christians was over $1500 whereas the 633 Muslims averaged $1143. What impact, then, does being a Christian have on the odds of rejecting conventional banking? Table 3 .6 examines the available data, adding religion to our list of variables at the expense of losing the data from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, where the question was not asked.
Wealth still seemed in Lebanon to diminish rather than increase opposition to conventional banking as in Saudi Arabia, but the negative correlation was weak and statistically insignificant (p < 0.253). In general, Christians are more likely to distinguish between bank interest and usury and to tolerate conventional banking practices. Controlling for the other variables in our model, the odds of the Christian opposing the conventional practices are reduced to .225 to 1, in other words to less than 1 to 4. Still it may be worth mentioning that 11.6 percent of the 490 Christians in the sample did oppose interestbased banking (compared with 47.3 percent of the Muslims, excluding Saudi Arabia and Yemen). Education in Lebanon, where most of the Christians were concentrated, 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC INTERACTIONS WITH IDEATIONAL VARIABLES
How do our ideational variables interact in the different national contexts? So far, it seems that religiosity and conservative attitudes toward women are the two ideational variables most closely associated with the rejection of conventional financial practices, but these spectra of opinion, along with their correlate of 'Islamism,' also display significant national variations. Does is follow that religiosity and conservative values have different effects, depending on their national cultural contexts, or do they interact in more or less the same way, despite national differences?
We have already seen in Tunisia ( Table 3 .4) that religiosity and 'women at home' increase the odds of rejecting interest-based banking pretty much as they do elsewhere in the aggregate (Table 3. 3) despite the cultural transformations of the country over the past century. To assess the other country specific interactions in the sample, while keeping the Muslim-Christian variable where it is relevant, we subdivide the sample by country. Table 3 .7 presents the findings (abbreviated just to present the statistical significance and the odds offered by each variable, controlling for the others) for each country. The results suggest that the interactions between religiosity, conservative attitudes toward women, and Islamism-secularism do indeed vary across national contexts.
As noted earlier, when controlling for the other variables, 'Islamism' correlates negatively (and therefore secularism positively) with rejecting interest-based banking in Tunisia and in the region as a whole. In Algeria, Egypt, Palestine and Yemen, however, the correlations are reversed. In Algeria, an increase of one point on the four-point scale ranging from secularism to Islamism is correlated with an increase of over 50 percent in the odds of rejecting these banks, controlling for the positive effects of religiosity and conservative values about women. While perhaps due to sample size, the result was not statistically significant. Algeria also strongly contradicted another general finding, about the weak negative relationship between interest in politics and rejection of conventional interest-based banking. Elsewhere, except in Egypt under a Muslim Brotherhood government, an interest in politics had virtually no relationship to attitudes about finance. The potential clientele for Islamic finance generally appears to be politically apathetic. In Algeria, however, the potential clientele can be mobilized. Conservative values, religiosity, and Islamism march hand in hand with political interest in rejecting conventional banking. In Egypt, too, at least in 2011, before rise and the fall of President Morsi, the Muslim Brothers seemed to be cultivating a political audience for Islamic finance. 10 The Egyptian survey also included questions about party affiliation. Of the 1219 Egyptians, only eight were actual members of a political party but an additional 95 intended to join one. Of these, only 46 expressed opposition to banks. Among future recruits to the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood) opinion was divided, with 15 opposed, 11 in favor and two in the middle, not expressing consistent responses to the questions concerning interest-based banks. Prospective members of the Tunisian Nahda also expressed mixed attitudes, as did ostensibly secular party sympathizers in both countries. Palestine and Yemen were the only other national environments in which Islamism increased the odds against interest-based banking, but they were not accompanied by any interest in politics. In Yemen an interest in politics is significantly associated with diminished odds! In Saudi Arabia, interest in politics is associated with even lower odds for rejecting conventional banking than in Yemen. Age, wealth and religiosity seem to be the only strong correlates, whereas conservative attitudes toward women and 'Islamism' work in the other direction. Given the pervasive religious culture and high penetration of Islamic finance in the kingdom, politics and 'Islamism' actually lower the odds against conventional banking. The more significant finding is that age, wealth and religiosity are all strongly and significantly correlated with the rejection of interest-based banking. Wealthy, pious senior citizens seem most ready to embrace Islamic finance, driving their portfolio diversification. Such preferences, possibly shared by other wealthy senior citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) states, may indeed be driving the expansion of Islamic finance in the region and beyond.
The conclusion, then, is that there is indeed a significant potential clientele in the Arab world for Islamic banking, and that it is largely the conservative, pious segments of the populations that are most favorably inclined. The survey confirms earlier impressions that Islamic finance represents an alliance between mainstream ulama, coopted to monitor compliance with Islamic jurisprudence, and conservative Muslim investors (Kahf, 2005) . It also draws attention to the special opportunities for Islamic finance in countries where conventional banking is soundly rejected and where there may be possibilities for political mobilization. Countries that are generally underbanked and little penetrated by Islamic finance may offer the greatest market opportunities.
RISING MARKET SHARES OF ISLAMIC BANKS
The market share data reported in Table 3 .8 trace the rise of Islamic banks in the MENA region and parts of Southeast Asia. In the 40 years since the Dubai Islamic Bank opened for business, the Islamic finance movement has obviously made great strides across the Muslim world, and even in parts of Europe and the United States that are not reported here. Table 3 .8 is a work in progress. 11 It includes all the countries surveyed in the Arab Barometer with the exception of Palestine.
Evidently Algeria, Lebanon, and Tunisia lag behind the other countries. Algeria deserves particular attention, given its large population (approaching 40 million) and oil wealth. The survey indicated, however, that over half the Algerians who answered both questions about bank interest opposed conventional banking, and the odds significantly increased among respondents expressing political interest and opposition to secularism. There is obvious dissatisfaction and a significant potential clientele, yet Islamic banking has apparently stagnated since 1991, when it was introduced to Algeria.
The Al Baraka Group created a joint venture at that time with the Banque d'Agriculture et Développement Rurale, one of Algeria's four dominant public sector banks, and despite the former's majority ownership Al Baraka Algeria seems to be managed like a public sector bank. It opened its doors for business just as Algeria's decade of civil war was underway. Efforts to privatize banking in Algeria then went astray in 2003 with a series of spectacular scandals and bankruptcies. Consequently, the government has not encouraged private sector banking, other than foreign banks, to penetrate what is still predominantly a state-run commercial banking system. The looming international financial crisis, notably trouble with housing loans at Citibank, deterred the Algerian government from privatizing one of its large public sector banks in 2007.
Algeria, however, is only one example of the seriously underdeveloped financing that has stunted investment and growth in much of the MENA.
12 One indicator of the impoverished nature of banking systems is the amount of loose currency outside them. People prefer to hold their cash, at least partly out of widespread distrust for conventional banking as indicated in the Arab Barometer surveys. In fact, the Arab countries can be compared along this dimension of 'contract-intensive money' (CIM) or the proportion of the broad (M2) money supply serviced by the commercial banking systems. 13 Within the region, as Table 3 .9 indicates, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen stand out for their relatively low CIM ratios, together with Morocco. The only comparable standouts seem to be some of those other Muslim countries that were part of the Soviet Union. They are not so different, however, from other former components of the USSR, such as Armenia, Georgia and the Russian heartland. The other Muslim comparators in Table 3 .9, Indonesia and Malaysia, support substantially higher CIM ratios and also, especially Malaysia, reflect substantial penetration of shariah-compliant instruments into the commercial banking system. Given these data, are there grounds for expecting that Islamic finance could become more inclusive than conventional banking and bring little investors and entrepreneurs out of the informal economy into a better protected environment of shariah-compliant financial intermediation? Islamic finance in Iraq, Sudan and Yemen already have substantial market shares comparable to those in the GCC countries, yet they remain underbanked. The survey data showed majorities still rejecting conventional banks in Iraq and Yemen, apparently driven by conservative values rather than politics, but in Sudan, where Islamic banking has a longer history linked to Hassan Turabi's rise to power. There is no longer majority support and 'Islamism' works against it. In Iraq and Yemen, politi- 14 During the period Syria's CIM ratio steadily rose until 2011, when it fell under the pressures of political events, terminating chances to test whether Islamic finance might be attracting new clienteles. Had violent jihadist factions not hijacked the opposition, both sides could have shared an interest in continuing experimentation with Islamic finance, a source of legitimation for the regime yet also, apart from dress codes and family status laws, one of the very few nonviolent 'Islamist' identity markers.
The countries with the greatest potential for Islamic finance may be those that are both underbanked and so far deprived of Islamic finance. Algeria and Morocco stand out as the most promising prospects. The survey further confirmed popular political support in Algeria for reinforcing the public sector efforts of Al-Baraka Algeria with more private management and initiatives. In the midst of a prolonged succession crisis, the necessary reforms in financial structure remain on hold, but meanwhile, Morocco was unfortunately not included in the second wave of surveys, is forging ahead, with legislation passed in November 2014 enabling Islamic banks and sukuk to finally to obtain licenses. 15 The countries that are less underbanked, such as Egypt and Jordan, also appear more open to Islamic finance. Far less penetrated by Islamic finance, Tunisia may offer interesting opportunities. Table 3 .4 indicated that it was not political interest or Islamism that was associated with the rejection of conventional banking, rather it was religiosity and conservative attitudes toward women. In other words, Islamic finance may progress in Tunisia quite independently of the country's politics. Although the Nahda Party lost the legislative elections held in October 2014, private business will continue to advocate sukuk and more Islamic banking to attract Gulf investors, if only to keep up with Morocco. In Egypt as well, sukuk legislation prepared under President Morsi is still likely to materialize, given the importance of wealthy private investors from the GCC countries.
Finally, the Gulf countries and Lebanon are highly banked, but Lebanon also stands out in the region as being averse to Islamic banking. Opinion about interest-based banking in Lebanon was apolitical and rooted in conservative Muslim values, but Beirut's bank culture has stubborn roots as well, among both Christian and Muslim bankers. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, propelled in part by rapid increases in shariah-compliant market shares (mainly within pre-existing conventional banks) associated with clients' age, religiosity and wealth, was reaching the higher CIM levels of its city-state neighbors.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has triangulated the results of Arab Barometer surveys with the penetration of Islamic finance into conventional banking across much of the MENA and parts of Asia and with the inclusiveness of their respective banking systems. Interesting patterns of potential development emerge. Among the underbanked (low CIM) states, notably Algeria and Morocco, survey data offer hope, as stated at the outset of this chapter, that Islamic finance may mobilize new constituencies of economic actors that will broaden the social bases of financial intermediation. These two countries are among the most populous, second only to Egypt, in the Arab world. Representative samples of their respective populations also registered among the highest percentages of people believing that bank interest is forbidden in Islam. In Algeria, where data was also available for rejection rates of conventional banking, the analysis of the survey results reveals a politically sensitized potential constituency for Islamic finance. Promoting Islamic finance more vigorously might serve the interests of both the government and Islamist oppositions. More inclusive banking could contribute to the diversification of the Algerian economy as well as giving the government added legitimacy and the opposition some substantive 'Islamist' achievement.
Saudi Arabia exemplifies another pattern of development that the other members of the GCC probably shared. These wealthy states have 'graduated' from cash-based economies with large informal sectors. Islamic finance did not serve so much to bring more people into the banking system as to be a creative means of portfolio diversification. Since the sum of private wealth in Saudi Arabia far outstrips that of the government (Luciani, 2005) , such diversification is likely to continue to be a catalyst for the development of Islamic finance and investment across the Muslim world.
The growth of Islamic finance is also likely to have broader implications for economic development in the region. Islamic finance underlines the need for greater transparency and accountability, because much of the financing is equity rather than debt based. Whether mudaraba or musharaka or even sukuk, these distinctively Islamic instruments are more akin to venture capital or shareholdings than to conventional debt. Corporate sukuk, for instance, while generating fixed sources of income, may be more similar to preferred stock than debentures, because in the event of bankruptcy the claims of conventional bondholders have priority. 16 Islamic banks at least in theory have a greater stake in transparency and accountability than conventional banks. Since their distinctive form of financing is equity rather than debt based, the investors require more extensive information about their entrepreneurs than the standard credit checklist for conventional borrowers. These theoretical considerations may be quite irrelevant to war zones in North Africa or the Levant but in the long run Islamic finance, by sapping the foundations of the MENA's informal economies and responding to popular desires for interest-free banking, may build up civil societies supporting civil states. Even if viewed as illiberal, such states may be more liberal and inclusive than military dictatorships. Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012: 56) , where they note that 12 percent of MENA respondents claimed religion to be the reason they did not have bank accounts, compared with 8 percent in South Asia and no more than 4 percent in other (mostly non-Muslim) regions of the world. 13. Clague et al. 1999 suggested that this ratio was a proxy for property rights and perhaps even for confidence in public institutions. 14. The Islamic banks by March 2011 held 15.4 percent of the total assets of Syria's burgeoning private sector, which had risen to contain 27.9 percent of the Syria's total commercial bank assets. 15. El Yaakoubi (2014). 16. See, for example, the National University of Singapore Business School case study by Hrnjic et al. (2014) , of 'Emirates Airline: a billion-dollar sukuk-bond issue', which compared the pricing of the sukuk with that of a slightly smaller conventional bond issue. In the event of bankruptcy, the conventional bondholders would have priority over the sukuk holders. The latter also was a cheaper source of funds for the airline.
